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THE PRIVACY ISSUES PRESENTED BY THE 
CYBERSECURITY INFORMATION SHARING ACT 
ABSTRACT 
 
On December 18, 2015, President Obama signed the Cybersecurity 
Information Sharing Act (“CISA”) into law.  CISA’s purpose is to combat 
cyber threats by promoting information sharing between private entities and 
government agencies.  CISA authorizes the Department of Homeland 
Security to facilitate the bulk collection of “cyber threat” and “defensive 
measure” information from the private sector.  Within CISA, the definitions 
of “cyber threat” and “defensive measure” are broad.  CISA also provides 
liability protection to entities that provide the information, and the 
information that is collected is not subject to open records laws.  There is 
little control on what information is collected or how it is used.  The flaws 
in the Act pose serious privacy risks. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
On December 18, 2015, President Obama signed the Cybersecurity Act 
of 2015, or the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (“CISA”),1 into 
law.2  The bill was a last second addition to the 2016 omnibus spending 
bill.3  The purpose of CISA is to establish a core cybersecurity information-
sharing framework between private entities and the federal government.4  
This framework, the participation in which is voluntary, provides for real-
time information sharing of “cyber threat indicators” and “defensive 
measures” between the government and the private sector.5 
Congress designed CISA to stem the rising tide of data breaches, 
private and public, by allowing companies to share cybersecurity threat data 
with the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”).6  The DHS could then 
use this data to combat the threats by developing defenses to these attacks 
and by issuing warnings about the threats they pose.7  These cybersecurity 
attacks are a very real threat.  As the DHS puts it: 
 Cyberspace is particularly difficult to secure due to a number of 
factors: the ability of malicious actors to operate from anywhere in 
the world, the linkages between cyberspace and physical systems, 
and the difficulty of reducing vulnerabilities and consequences in 
 
1. Cybersecurity Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-113, 129 Stat. 2242 [hereinafter CISA].  
2. Tom Risen, Obama Signs Cybersecurity Law in Spending Package, U.S. NEWS AND 
WORLD REP. (Dec. 18, 2015), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015-12-18/obama-signs-
cybersecurity-law-in-spending-package. 
3. Id. 
4. David J. Bender, Congress Passes the Cybersecurity Act of 2015, NAT’L L. REV. (Dec. 20, 
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complex cyber networks.  Of growing concern is the cyber threat 
to critical infrastructure, which is increasingly subject to 
sophisticated cyber intrusions that pose new risks.  As information 
technology becomes increasingly integrated with physical 
infrastructure operations, there is increased risk for wide scale or 
high-consequence events that could cause harm or disrupt services 
upon which our economy and the daily lives of millions of 
Americans depend.  In light of the risk and potential consequences 
of cyber events, strengthening the security and resilience of 
cyberspace has become an important homeland security mission.8 
 In 2015 alone, over $1 billion was stolen and 300 million records were 
leaked.9  Several high-profile cyber-attacks have highlighted these risks.10 
In 2013, hackers breached Target’s payment systems, stealing approx-
imately 40 million credit and debit card accounts.11  This breach cost Target 
approximately $250 million.12  In 2014, a hack at Sony Corp. exposed 
Hollywood secrets, compromised employee records, and destroyed 
company data.13  In October 2015, Sony settled employee claims for $8 
million.14  In 2015, the adult-themed, extramarital affair website Ashley 
Madison was hacked.15  Those hackers exposed the personal information of 
some 32 million users.16  The United States government is also a target.  In 
an attack that began in 2014 and continued for several months thereafter, 
hackers accessed and stole the background investigation records of millions 
of current, former, and prospective federal employees and contractors.17 
 
8. Cybersecurity Overview, U.S. DEPT. OF HOMELAND SECURITY (Sept. 22, 2015), https:// 
www.dhs.gov/cybersecurity-overview. 
9. Paul Szoldra, The 9 Worst Cyber Attacks of 2015, TECH INSIDER (Dec. 29, 2015), http:// 
www.techinsider.io/cyberattacks-2015-12. 
10. Id. 
11. Associated Press and James Eng, Target Reaches Settlement with Visa Over 2013 Data 
Breach, NBC NEWS (Aug. 18, 2015), http://www nbcnews.com/tech/security/target-reaches-
settlement-visa-over-2013-data-breach-n412071. 
12. Kevin M. McGinty, Target Data Breach Price Tag: $252 Million and Counting, 
PRIVACY AND SECURITY MATTERS (Feb. 26, 2015), https://www.privacyandsecuritymatters.com/ 
2015/02/target-data-breach-price-tag-252-million-and-counting/. 
13. Edward Peterson, Sony to Pay as Much as $8 Million to Settle Data-Breach Case, 
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 20, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-20/sony-to-pay-
as-much-as-8-million-to-settle-data-breach-claims. 
14. Id. 
15. Robert Hackett, What to Know About the Ashley Madison Hack, FORTUNE (Aug. 26, 
2015), http://fortune.com/2015/08/26/ashley-madison-hack/. 
16. Id. 
17. James Eng, OPM Hack: Government Finally Starts Notifying 21.5 Million Victims, NBC 
NEWS (Oct. 1, 2015), http://www nbcnews.com/tech/security/opm-hack-government-finally-
starts-notifying-21-5-million-victims-n437126. 
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The hackers also stole the fingerprints of 5.6 million federal employees.18 
There are countless other examples.19 
These hackers are technologically advanced.20  They innovate and 
adapt to new technologies.21  Their methods are complex.22  The attacks 
range from lone wolf hits to large, coordinated assaults.23  The attacks can 
be launched from anywhere in the world and are difficult to combat.24  
CISA is meant to help combat these attacks through more robust and timely 
sharing of cyber threat information both between the government and the 
private sector and between private companies themselves.25 
While its goal may be commendable, CISA has its share of critics.26  
The criticism revolves around privacy and the efficacy of the Act.27  New 
America’s Open Technology Institute sent a coalition letter to the Senate 
stating that CISA would “seriously threaten privacy and civil liberties, and 
could undermine cybersecurity, rather than enhance it.”28  The letter goes 
on to say that “CISA fails to provide both strong privacy protections and 
adequate clarity about what actions can be taken, what information can be 
shared, and how that information may be used by the government.”29  The 
Institute is not alone; technology giants such as Apple, Google, Amazon 
and Microsoft also oppose the bill.30 
 
18. Id. 
19. See Lewis Morgan, List of Data Breaches and Cyber Attacks in 2015 – over 480 Million 
Leaked Records, IT GOVERNANCE (Jan. 8, 2016), http://www.itgovernance.co.uk/blog/list-of-
data-breaches-and-cyber-attacks-in-2015-over-275-million-leaked-records/.  
20. Raja Patel, Study Reveals the Most Common Attack Methods of Data Thieves, 
INFORMATIONWEEK (July 30, 2015), http://www.darkreading.com/partner-perspectives/intel/ 
study-reveals-the-most-common-attack-methods-of-data-thieves/a/d-id/1321544.   
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. Id.  
24. Id. 
25. Christopher Harvie & Cynthia J. Larose, Happy New Year - Cybersecurity Information 
Sharing Act, NAT’L L. REV. (Jan. 6, 2015), http://www natlawreview.com/article/happy-new-
year-cybersecurity-information-sharing-act. 
26. Abigail Tracy, The Problems Experts and Privacy Advocates Have with The Senate’s 




28. Robyn Greene, Coalition Letter from 55 Civil Society Groups, Security Experts, and 
Academics Opposing CISA, OPEN TECH. INST. (Apr. 21, 2015), https://www newamerica.org/oti/ 
coalition-letter-from-55-civil-society-groups-security-experts-and-academics-opposing-cisa/. 
29. Id. 
30. Joe Paglieri, Apple and Other Tech Giants Slam Anti-Hacking Bill for Being Creepy, 
CNN (Oct. 26, 2015), http://money.cnn.com/2015/10/26/technology/cisa-cybersecurity-bill-
senate/; Jeffrey Schwartz, Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act Sets Back Privacy, REDMOND 
MAG. (Dec. 21, 2015), https://redmondmag.com/blogs/the-schwartz-report/2015/12/security-act-
sets-back-privacy.aspx. 
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Everyone agrees that the world is facing an enormous cyber threat.  
The question is whether another government information system in general, 
and CISA specifically, is the right way to addresses that threat. 
II.  THE CYBERSECURITY INFORMATION SHARING ACT 
The purpose of CISA is to detect, prevent, or mitigate cyber security 
threats or security vulnerabilities.31  In order to do so, CISA requires the 
Director of National Intelligence, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the 
Secretary of Defense, and the Attorney General to develop procedures for 
private entities to share information with, between, and among government 
entities.32  These procedures are to be developed in consultation with the  
appropriate Federal entities.33  Private entities are not required to participate 
but rather may share and receive any “cyber threat indicator” and 
“defensive measure” with other entities and the federal government.34  
Entities that participate are given liability protection related to the 
information that they provide.35 
CISA mandates that the Attorney General and Secretary of Homeland 
Security develop information sharing procedures that allow the federal 
government to receive “cyber threat indicators and defensive measures” 
from private entities.36  CISA also mandates that these indicators and 
measures are shared with the appropriate federal entities in an automated, 
real-time manner.37  The Act defines “appropriate federal entities” as the 
Department of Commerce, the Department of Defense, the Department of 
Energy, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, 
the Department of the Treasury, and the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence.38  The National Security Agency (“NSA”) would also be 
included since it falls under the Director of National Intelligence.39 
 
31. See S. REP. NO. 114-32, at 1 (2015). 
32. CISA § 103(a), (a)(1)-(5).  
33. Id. § 103(b)(2).  
34. Id. § 104(c)(1).  
35. Id. § 106(b).  As long as the information is provided “in accordance with this [act]” 
private entities are protected from liability.  Id §106(b)(1).  If the information is so provided, “[n]o 
cause of action shall lie or be maintained in any court against any entity, and such action shall be 
promptly dismissed, for the sharing or receipt of cyber threat indicators or defensive measures 
under [this act].”  Id. § 106(b). 
36. Id. § 105(a). 
37. Id. § 105(a)(3)(A)(i)-(ii). 
38. Id. § 102(3). 
39. See OFF. OF THE DIRECTOR OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, http://www.dni.gov/index.php/ 
intelligence-community/members-of-the-ic (last visited April 15, 2016). 
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One of the tenants of CISA is the timely delivery of cybersecurity 
threat information to the agencies that need it.40  The information that is 
collected must be shared with all of the federal agencies that need it.41  The 
Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination 
with other federal agencies, are ultimately responsible for the policies and 
procedures that govern the data collection process.42  These procedures are 
meant to promulgate: 
(1) the timely sharing of classified cyber threat indicators and 
defensive measures in the possession of the Federal Government 
with representatives of relevant Federal entities and non-Federal 
entities that have appropriate security clearances; 
(2) the timely sharing with relevant Federal entities and non-
Federal entities of cyber threat indicators, defensive measures, and 
information relating to cybersecurity threats or authorized uses 
under this title, in the possession of the Federal Government that 
may be declassified and shared at an unclassified level; 
(3) the timely sharing with relevant Federal entities and non-
Federal entities, or the public if appropriate, of unclassified, 
including controlled unclassified, cyber threat indicators and 
defensive measures in the possession of the Federal Government; 
(4) the timely sharing with Federal entities and non-Federal 
entities, if appropriate, of information relating to cybersecurity 
threats or authorized uses under this title, in the possession of the 
Federal Government about cybersecurity threats to such entities to 
prevent or mitigate adverse effects from such cybersecurity 
threats; and 
(5) the periodic sharing, through publication and targeted outreach, 
of cybersecurity best practices that are developed based on 
ongoing analyses of cyber threat indicators, defensive measures, 
and information relating to cybersecurity threats or authorized uses 
under this title, in the possession of the Federal Government, with 
attention to accessibility and implementation challenges faced by 
small business concerns (as defined in section 3 of the Small 
Business Act (15 U.S.C. 632)).43 
 
40. CISA § 105(a)(3)(A)(ii). 
41. Id. § 105(a)(3)(A)(i).  
42. Id. § 105(a)(2). 
43. Id. § 103(a). 
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In addition to cybersecurity, the information collected under this 
program can also be used to respond to, prevent, mitigate, and prosecute 
certain crimes.44  These crimes include fraud, identity theft, espionage, 
censorship, and trade secrets.45  The information can also be used in order 
to respond to, prevent, or mitigate a specific threat of death, serious bodily 
harm, or serious economic harm46 or to protect a minor from harm or sexual 
exploitation.47  These non-cybersecurity related uses are included in CISA 
despite the fact the bill’s purpose is to combat cybersecurity threats.  The 
information is not supposed to be used by the government to monitor lawful 
activities.48  Finally, the collected information is not supposed to include 
any personal information unless that information specifically relates to a 
cyber threat.49 
From an oversight perspective, CISA requires the Director of National 
Intelligence to periodically report to the Intelligence Committees of the 
House and Senate.50  These reports should include an assessment of the 
current cybersecurity risks, the ability of the United States Government to 
respond to or prevent cyber attacks, an assessment of current intelligence 
sharing and cooperation relationships with other countries, and an 
assessment of adding additional technologies in order to enhance the 
security of the United States.51 
Taken in total, CISA authorizes the federal government to create a new 
database in order to track cybersecurity threat information.  While 
addressing the cybersecurity threat seems to make sense, the question is 
whether this database is the right tool to address the issue. 
III.  THE ISSUES WITH CISA 
The first issue with CISA is how it actually became law.  CISA did not 
pass on its own.  Rather, it was added as a rider to the 2016 spending bill.52  
The bill was passed, at least in part, in order to avoid a government 
shutdown.53  At some point in the budget negotiations,54 CISA was added to 
 
44. Id. § 105(d)(5)(A).  
45. Id. § 105(d)(5)(A)(v)(I)-(III). 
46. Id. § 105(d)(5)(A)(iii). 
47. Id. § 105(d)(5)(A)(iv). 
48. See id. § 104(a)(2)(A)-(B). 
49. Id. § 104(d)(2). 
50. Id. § 109(a).  
51. Id. § 109(b)(1)-(5). 
52. Bender, supra note 4.  
53. See Alexandra Howard, Congress Ties Controversial Cybersecurity Bill to Key Spending 
Package, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 16, 2015), http://www huffingtonpost.com/entry/cisa-omnibus 
-spending-bill567176b7e4b0dfd4bcc00143. 
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the $1.1 trillion appropriations bill and ultimately became law.55  Prior to 
becoming law, there were at least two separate versions of the bill: one in 
the House of Representatives and one in the Senate.56  Neither version 
ultimately passed.57  Opponents of the bill were disappointed that the 
opportunity for “open and robust negotiation” regarding the controversial 
bill was lost.58 
 Passing the Federal budget before the end of the year was a key 
priority and became a fortuitous opportunity for Congress to slip in 
the controversial Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 
into the spending bill, which President Obama on Friday signed 
into law.  IT providers Amazon, Apple, Google, Microsoft and 
others have opposed measures in CISA, which seeks to thwart 
crime and terrorism but facilitates mass surveillance via the 
sharing of information between companies and the government, 
notably the National Security Agency.59 
The fact that CISA was not debated on its own merits opens questions into 
why the final version differed from previous versions.60 
A. RISKS REGARDING DATA COLLECTION 
Now that CISA has become law, the question turns to what effect the 
law will have, both in terms of combating cyber attacks but also for privacy.  
Privacy advocates are reluctant to give the NSA another avenue to collect 
information on United States citizens.61  Because the NSA has access to the 
data, there is legitimate concern that CISA is just another surveillance bill 
 
54. Laura Barron-Lopez and Matt Fuller, Lawmakers Finally Reach Deal On Spending Bill, 
Tax Package, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 16, 2015), http://www huffingtonpost.com/entry/congress 
-omnibus-deal5670c8cee4b0dfd4bcbfe05f?9ipgy14i. 
55. President Obama signed the bill on December 18, 2015.  Risen, supra note 2.  
56. Compare S. 754, 114th Cong. (2015) with  H.R. 1560, 114th Cong. (2015).  
57. See Pub. L. No. 114-113, 129 Stat. 2242 for the version that ultimately became law..  
58. OTI Deeply Disappointed About Passage of Dangerous Cybersecurity Bill, OPEN TECH. 
INST. (Dec. 18, 2105), https://www newamerica.org/oti/oti-deeply-disappointed-about-passage-of-
dangerous-cybersecurity-bill/.  See also Press Release, Wyden Votes ‘No’ on Harmful Cyber Bill 
and Weakening Oversight of Surveillance Programs (Dec. 18, 2015), https://www.wy 
den.senate.gov/news/press-releases/wyden-votes-no-on-harmful-cyber-bill-and-weakening-
oversight-of-surveillance-programs (“Ultimately, I cannot vote for this badly flawed CISA bill.  
The latest version of the CISA is the worst one yet – it contains substantially fewer oversight and 
reporting provisions than the Senate version did.  That means that violations of Americans’ 
privacy will be more likely to go unnoticed.”).  
59. Schwartz, supra note 30.  
60. See infra Part III.B.  
61. Peter Hess, Controversial New Cybersecurity Law May Compromise Privacy: Critics 
Argue that CISA is More About Surveillance than Security, SCIENCELINE (Jan. 24, 2016), 
http://scienceline.org/2016/01/controversial-new-cybersecurity-law-may-compromise-privacy/. 
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disguised as cyber security.62  By its nature, CISA allows the government to 
collect vast amounts of data.63  Specifically, CISA authorizes the 
government to collect information regarding “cybersecurity threats.”64  
CISA defines these threats as: 
[A]n action, not protected by the First Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States, on or through an information 
system that may result in an unauthorized effort to adversely 
impact the security, availability, confidentiality, or integrity of an 
information system or information that is stored on, processed by, 
or transiting an information system.65 
This definition is broad and ambiguous.  Some very benign activities meet 
the literal definition of a cybersecurity threat.  Under this definition, for 
example, a parent attempting to access their child’s YouTube account 
would be a “cybersecurity threat.”  Technically speaking, this would be an 
unauthorized effort to adversely impact the security of information stored 
on an information system.66  In order to combat these “cybersecurity 
threats,” CISA authorizes the collection of information that it defines as 
“cyber threat indicators” and “defensive measures.”67 
A “cyber threat indicator” is defined as “information that is necessary 
to describe or identify” one of the following: 
(A) malicious reconnaissance, including anomalous patterns of 
communications that appear to be transmitted for the purpose of 
gathering technical information related to a cybersecurity threat or 
security vulnerability; 
(B) a method of defeating a security control or exploitation of a 
security vulnerability; 
(C) a security vulnerability, including anomalous activity that 
appears to indicate the existence of a security vulnerability; 
 
62. Russell Brandon, Congress Snuck a Surveillance Bill into the Federal Budget Last Night, 
VERGE (Dec. 16, 2015), http://www.theverge.com/2015/12/16/10288182/cisa-surveillance-cyber-
security-budget-proposal. 
63. Id. 
64. CISA § 104 
65. Id. § 102(5). 
66. The CISA definition of “information system” is equally broad.  CISA refers to the 
definition that is used in 44 U.S.C. § 3502.  See id. § 102(9)(A).  Section 3502 defines an 
“information system” as “a discrete set of information resources organized for the collection, 
processing, maintenance, use, sharing, dissemination, or disposition of information.”  44 U.S.C. § 
3502(8) (2016). 
67. CISA § 104(c). 
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(D) a method of causing a user with legitimate access to an 
information system or information that is stored on, processed by, 
or transiting an information system to unwittingly enable the 
defeat of a security control or exploitation of a security 
vulnerability; 
(E) malicious cyber command and control; 
(F) the actual or potential harm caused by an incident, including a 
description of the information exfiltrated as a result of a particular 
cybersecurity threat; 
(G) any other attribute of a cybersecurity threat, if disclosure of 
such attribute is not otherwise prohibited by law; or 
(H) any combination thereof.68 
Like the definition of “cybersecurity threat,” this definition is too broad 
to be meaningful.  For instance, the DHS has acknowledged that a violation 
of a consumer service agreement69 would technically qualify as a 
“cybersecurity threat.”70  Internet service providers generally require these 
agreements in order for customers to access many websites.  Because a 
violation of one of these agreements is technically a “cybersecurity threat,” 
the activity related to these violations could be considered a “cyber threat 
indicator.”71  The DHS dismisses this technicality by stating that activities 
that “solely” violate a consumer service agreement do not qualify as 
“cybersecurity threat[s].”72  What the term “solely” means is not entirely 
clear.  If a violation of a consumer agreement otherwise meets the definition 
of a “cybersecurity threat,” how is it to be determined if that violation was 
“solely” a violation of the consumer agreement? 
The definition of a “defensive measure” is equally broad.  “Defensive 
measure[s]” are defined as “an action, device, procedure, signature, 
technique, or other measure applied to an information system or 
information that is stored on, processed by, or transiting an information 
 
68. Id. § 102(6)(A)-(H). 
69. This would include Website Usage Agreements and the agreements that are typically 
required by Internet Service Providers.  
70. On February 16, 2016, the DHS released guidance on what would constitute a 
“cybersecurity threat.”  In this guidance, DHS acknowledged that many terms included in 
consumer licensing agreements technically “satisfy the definition of a ‘cybersecurity threat.’” 
DEPT. OF HOMELAND SECURITY, GUIDANCE TO ASSIST NON-FEDERAL ENTITIES TO SHARE 
CYBER THREAT INDICATORS AND DEFENSIVE MEASURES WITH FEDERAL ENTITIES UNDER THE 
CYBERSECURITY INFORMATION SHARING ACT OF 2015, at 4 n.6 (Feb. 16, 2016). 
71. See id. 
72. Id. (“Many terms of service agreements prohibit activities that satisfy the definition of a 
‘cybersecurity threat.’  However, activities that are ‘solely’ violations of consumer agreements but 
do not otherwise meet the definition are not cybersecurity threats under CISA.”) 
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system that detects, prevents, or mitigates a known or suspected 
cybersecurity threat or security vulnerability.”73  Boiled down, this 
definition becomes anything that detects, prevents, or mitigates a cyber 
threat, real or not.  CISA authorizes private entities to operate defensive 
measures “for cybersecurity purposes.”74  Since CISA defines 
“cybersecurity purpose” as the “purpose of protecting an information 
system” or the information on an information system, it is unclear what 
specifically CISA is authorizing private entities to do.75  Private entities can 
already deploy “defensive measures” that “detect, prevent or mitigate” 
“cybersecurity threats” on their own “information systems” for a 
“cybersecurity purpose.” 
The larger problem is that CISA authorizes the government to collect a 
huge amount of data without a warrant or probable cause.76  In some cases, 
CISA allows the government to use that data for non-cybersecurity 
purposes.77  Furthermore, because the definition of “cyber threat indicator” 
is so broad, a private entity could send the government nearly any piece of 
information.  In addition, CISA gives the private entities that provide the 
government with information liability protection for providing that 
information.78  Finally, the data that the government collects is immune 
from public records laws.79 
This combination, the broad definition for what information can be 
provided, the liability protection for the providers, and the exemption from 
public records laws, allows the government to collect vast amounts of data 
that they would not otherwise be legally able to obtain.  There is no public 
oversight since the government does not have to disclose what information 
they have collected.80  This information could include an individual’s 
private, personally identifiable information.81  CISA only requires that 
 
73. CISA § 102(7).  The “known or suspected” language is also very broad.  CISA does not 
set forth a standard to determine what constitutes valid suspicion. 
74. Id. § 104(b). 
75. Id. § 102(4). 
76. CISA allows the government to use the information for purposes beyond cybersecurity.  
The information can also be used to prevent or mitigate specific threats of death, serious bodily 
injury, and serious economic harm, to protect minors, and for investigating and prosecuting 
certain crimes.  See id. §105(d)(5)(A).  
77. See infra Part III.B.  
78. CISA provides liability protection to information providers so long as they provide 
information “in accordance with this title.”  CISA § 106(a)-(b). 
79. The information that the government collects under CISA “shall be” “exempt from 
disclosure” and “withheld, without discretion, from the public.”  Id. § 105(d)(3)(A)-(B). 
80. Id. 
81. CISA only requires private entities to remove personal information if they “know[] at the 
time of sharing” that the personal information is “not directly related to a cybersecurity threat.”  
Id. § 104(d)(2)  (emphasis added). 
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private entities filter personal information that it knows, at the time the data 
is shared, is not related to a cyber threat.82  This provides little protection 
for an individual whose private information is shared with the government.  
How does that individual prove that the entity knew, at the time the entity 
provided the information, that the individual was not a threat?  It is nearly 
impossible to know that someone is not a threat.   
In addition, there is no requirement that private entities that provide the 
government with personal information correct that data if, after the fact, the 
entity determines that the information that they provided was incorrect.83 
Therefore, a private entity can provide the government with incorrect 
personal information and still retain its liability protection. So long as the 
entity did not know that the individual was not a threat when they provided 
the information, they are in compliance with CISA and would enjoy the 
liability protection that it provides.84  The legislation states that “[n]o cause 
of action shall lie or be maintained in any court against any private entity . . 
. for the sharing or receipt of a cyber threat indicator or defensive measure” 
as long as the information is provided “in accordance with [CISA].”85  
Because of the immunity, there is no penalty for giving the government 
personal information, even if that information is incorrect.  Therefore, a 
private entity could give the government incorrect personal information 
about an individual that could sit on a government server indefinitely.  
Further, that individual would not even know that information was there 
because there is no notification requirement included in CISA.86 
B. RISKS REGARDING GOVERNMENT DATA USE 
Once the government gets the information, it can use it for a host of 
purposes unrelated to cybersecurity.87  It can be used by “any Federal 
agency or department, component, officer, employee, or agent of the 
Federal Government” in order to investigate and prosecute a host of 
 
82. See id. 
83. CISA requires the government to develop procedures for notifying “entities and Federal 
entities” when it knows that information it has received does not constitute a cyber threat 
indicator.  This provision does not apply to the private entities that provide the government 
information. Id. § 105(b)(3)(E).  
84. CISA does rescind the immunity in cases of gross negligence or willful conduct on the 
part of the provider.  CISA § 106(c)(1). 
85. Id. § 106(b), (b)(1). 
86. CISA is immune from public records laws.  Information shared with the government 
shall be “withheld, without discretion from the public.”  Id. § 105(d)(3)(B). 
87. See id. § 105(d)(5)(A)(iii)-(v). 
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crimes.88  Those crimes include fraud, identity theft, espionage, censorship, 
and threats related to minors.89 
The information can also be used in order to prevent or mitigate “a 
specific threat of death, a specific threat of serious bodily harm, or a 
specific threat of serious economic harm.”90  The “specific threat” language 
is important.  The Senate version of the bill only authorized the government 
to use the data when there was an “imminent threat.”91  The use of the term 
“specific” rather than “imminent” authorizes the government to hold and 
use the information longer than it would otherwise have been able to.92  An 
imminent threat means just that—imminent.  Immediate action is required 
in order to address an imminent threat.  A “specific threat,” on the other 
hand, is different.  A specific threat does not necessarily expire; it could 
conceivably last forever.  Therefore, the government, including the NSA, 
can retain the information much longer under the “specific threat” standard 
than they could have under an “imminent threat” standard. 
This change in standards is one reason that some privacy experts and 
some legislators are upset about the fact that CISA was tacked on to the 
budget bill and passed with no real debate.93  The version passed by the 
Senate in October 2015 contained the “imminent threat” language.94  
However, the bill that ultimately became law in December changed the 
language to “specific.”95  Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR) both voted against 
the process with which CISA was passed and the bill itself.96  After the 
bill’s passage, a press release was issued regarding why Senator Wyden did 
not vote for it. 
 Republican leaders inserted an extreme version of the 
Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (CISA) and the flawed 
2016 Intelligence Authorization Act into a broader package of 
spending and tax bills. 
 
88. Id. § 105(d)(5)(A), (A)(ii)-(v). 
89. Id. § 105(d)(5)(A)(iv)-(v). 
90. Id. § 105(d)(5)(A)(iii) (emphases added). 
91. Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015, S. 754, 114th Cong. § 105(d)(5)(A)(iv) 
(as passed by Senate, Oct. 27, 2015) (emphasis added).   
92. The removal of the imminence of harm requirement “opens the door for the FBI to pool 
the cyber threat indicators it receives under the legislation and repeatedly mine it to investigate 
activity unrelated to cybersecurity that may not even constitute a crime, and that does not pose any 
immediate threat.  This makes the legislation seem as much a surveillance as a cybersecurity bill.” 
Butler & Nojeim, supra note 91.  
93. See Risen, supra note 2.  
94. Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015, S. 754, 114th Cong. § 105(d)(5)(A)(iv) 
(as passed by Senate, Oct. 27, 2015). 
95. CISA § 105(d)(5)(A)(iii). 
96. Press Release, supra note 58.  
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 “These unacceptable surveillance provisions are a black mark 
on a worthy package that contains the biggest tax cut for working 
families in decades, an accomplishment I fought for in weeks of 
negotiations,” Wyden said. 
 “Unfortunately, this misguided cyber legislation does little to 
protect Americans’ security, and a great deal more to threaten our 
privacy than the flawed Senate version.  Americans demand real 
solutions that will protect them from foreign hackers, not knee-jerk 
responses that allow companies to fork over huge amounts of their 
customers’ private data with only cursory review.[”]97 
This change is indicative of the inherent danger that comes with attaching a 
bill like CISA to a huge budget bill.  The changed language essentially 
increased the government’s authority to collect data and did so without 
Congressional debate.98  CISA authorizes the government to use the 
information it collects for non-cybersecurity purposes, and it authorizes the 
government to keep that information for as long as it considers there to be a 
“specific threat.”99  The specific language authorizes “any Federal agency 
or department” to use the information for: 
(iii) the purpose of responding to, or otherwise preventing or 
mitigating, a specific threat of death, a specific threat of serious 
bodily harm, or a specific threat of serious economic harm, 
including a terrorist act or a use of a weapon of mass destruction; 
(iv) the purpose of responding to, investigating, prosecuting, or 
otherwise preventing or mitigating, a serious threat to a minor, 
including sexual exploitation and threats to physical safety; or 
(v) the purpose of preventing, investigating, disrupting, or 
prosecuting an offense arising out of a threat described in clause 
(iii) or any of the offenses listed in— 
(I) sections 1028 through 1030 of title 18, United States Code 
(relating to fraud and identity theft); 
(II) chapter 37 of such title (relating to espionage and 
censorship); and 





99. CISA § 105(d)(5)(A)(iii). 
100. Id. § 105(d)(5)(A)(iii)-(v). 
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CISA is supposed to be a cybersecurity bill, but these are not cybersecurity 
purposes.  Section §105(d)(5)(A)(v) allows the government to use the CISA 
information in order to prosecute the offenses.101  In these cases, then, the 
government is using evidence that it acquired without a warrant or even 
probable cause. 
This is an issue. The CISA data is shared with government agencies, 
including the NSA.  In fact, CISA mandates that all of the information be 
shared with federal agencies in “real-time.”102  In order to save time and 
facilitate this “real-time” delivery, CISA mandates that the information not 
be modified prior to dissemination to the various agencies.103  That means 
that there is no filtering mechanism to remove personal information or even 
correct erroneous information.  This lack of control puts efforts to filter out 
personal information at risk and will likely result in government agencies, 
including the NSA, receiving unauthorized personal data.104 
 CISA would significantly increase the National Security 
Agency’s (NSA) access to personal information, and authorize the 
federal government to use that information for a myriad of 
purposes unrelated to cybersecurity. The revelations of the past 
two years concerning the intelligence community’s abuses of 
surveillance authorities and the scope of its collection and use of 
individuals’ information demonstrates the potential for 
government overreach, particularly when statutory language is 
broad or ambiguous.  Notably, Congress has yet to enact reforms 
that would effectively rein in the government’s activities.105 
The lack of public oversight and the liability protection for private entities 
aggravate the issue.  There is no way for an individual to determine if the 
NSA, or any other agency, has received or has used unauthorized 
information.  Therefore, there is a significant risk that CISA will result in 
the unauthorized collection and use of the personal information of 
American citizens. 
IV. CISA IS FLAWED 
While the cybersecurity threat facing the nation is serious, CISA is not 
the answer to the problem.  It is unclear how giving the government 
 
101. Id. § 105(d)(5)(A)(v). 
102. Id. § 105(a)(3)(A)(i)-(ii). 
103. CISA prioritizes the speed of delivery over content control.  It restricts actions that 
delay or impede the dissemination to the agencies.  Id. § 105(a)(3)(A)(ii), (B)(ii).   
104. Greene, supra note 28.  
105. Id. 
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authorization to build another method for the collection of huge amounts of 
data would reduce the threat.  The information that CISA authorizes the 
government to collect is too broad.  There are too few controls on what 
information the government collects and on how it uses that information.  In 
fact, CISA specifically authorizes the government to use the information for 
non-cybersecurity purposes.  The information is collected without a warrant 
or probable cause, yet CISA authorizes the government to use that 
information in order to prosecute certain crimes.  In the end, CISA is a 
flawed bill that looks more like a surveillance law than a cybersecurity bill. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act was signed into law on 
December 18, 2015.106  The law is an effort to combat cybersecurity threats 
by increasing information sharing between the private sector and the 
government.107  The DHS is tasked with collecting the data and dissem-
inating it to the other federal agencies, including the NSA.108 The 
information flowing from the private entities to the government lacks the 
control required to ensure that there is no unauthorized collection of 
personal information.  There are no effective controls to ensure that the 
information is not used for an unauthorized purpose, and the bill authorizes 
the information to be used for purposes not related to cybersecurity.  In 
effect, CISA provides the government with the ability to conduct 
warrantless searches on the unauthorized personal information that it 






106. Risen, supra note 2.  
107. S. REP. NO. 114-32, at 1 (2015). 
108. CISA § 105(c). 
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